University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 18

Issue 3

Article 6

2007

Constitutional Law: The Reasonableness Requirement and Fourth
Amendment Boundaries to Co-Occupant Consent
Tim Buskirk

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp

Recommended Citation
Buskirk, Tim (2007) "Constitutional Law: The Reasonableness Requirement and Fourth Amendment
Boundaries to Co-Occupant Consent," University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol. 18: Iss. 3,
Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol18/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

FOREWORD
THE CONSTITUTION AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Erwin Chemerinsky"
During the twenty year existence of the University of FloridaJournal
of Law and Public Policy remarkably little has changed in the content of
fundamental rights under the Constitution or in the scholarly debate about
them. During this period, which spanned the Rehnquist Court and the first
few years of the Roberts Court, the Supreme Court has recognized no new
fundamental rights. The closest the Court came was in Lawrence v. Texas,
where the Court held that a state may not prohibit private homosexual
activity between consenting adults. But Lawrencedid not use the language
of fundamental rights or explicitly employ strict scrutiny. Nor has the
Court found any additional type of discrimination to warrant intermediate
or strict scrutiny during this time.
At the same time, the scholarly debate over constitutional interpretation
has changed remarkably little over the last two decades. There continues
to be a huge divide between justices and scholars who deem themselves
originalists, believing that the Constitution's meaning was fixed when it
was adopted and can be changed only by amendment, and those who reject
this view, believing that the Constitution evolves by interpretation as well
as amendment. The arguments for and against originalism are familiar and
have changed remarkably little over time.
So what has constitutional law been about for the last twenty years in
which this journal has been published? The articles in this issue reflect the
important matters that are the focus of contemporary decisions and
discussions about fundamental rights. First, the Supreme Court constantly
is asked to clarify the scope of existing rights. To pick a few prominent
examples, do laws prohibiting so-called partial birth abortion violate the
right to abortion?2 If the government takes private property for purposes of
economic development, is that properly deemed for "public use"?3
Countless cases ask the Court to resolve disagreements concerning the
* Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University.
1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (upholding the constitutionality
of the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)
(invalidating a Nebraska law prohibiting partial birth abortion).
3. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

application of existing rights. For example, as discussed in Tim Buskirk's
excellent comment,4 in Georgiav. Randolph, the Court had to decide when
a co-occupant can give consent to search a dwelling when the target of the
search is present and refuses to give approval.5 This case is typical of so
many that provide important clarification as to the application and scope
of rights, but does not create new rights.
Second, the Court has significantly changed the content of rights in
some areas without using the label of fundamental rights. This has
occurred primarily, but not exclusively, in the criminal procedure area. For
example, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court dramatically changed the
law as to the role of the jury by holding that any factor, other than a prior
conviction, that increases the defendant's sentence must be proven to the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.6 Another example is the Court's decision
in Crawfordv. Washington,which held that testimonial evidence could not
be used against a criminal defendant simply because the declarant was
unavailable and the statements were reliable.7 These decisions have
spawned an enormous number of questions, and there are countless
decisions clarifying them, including from the United States Supreme
Court.
An example from the civil arena has been the constitutional limits on
the amount of punitive damages. In three major decisions over the last
eleven years-BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,8 State Farm v.
Campbell,9 and Philip Morris USA v. Williams'°-the Court has revived
substantive due process as a protector of economic liberties and has
imposed significant constraints on punitive damage awards.
Third, the Court has had to begin considering constitutional rights in
the context of the war on terrorism. There have been only a few cases so
far-Hamdi v. Rumsfeld," Rasul v. Bush, 2 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld' 3-but no
area of law has been more important since September 11. Ariel
Meyerstein's magnificent article situates these cases in cultural rhetoric
4. Tim Buskirk, Comment, Constitutional Law: The Reasonableness Requirement and
FourthAmendment Boundariesto Co-Occupant Consent, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 475(2007).
5. 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
6. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
7. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
8. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
9. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
10. 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
11. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (stating that the federal government may hold a United States citizen
apprehended in a foreign country as an enemy combatant, but must provide due process).
12. 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (finding that those held in Guantanamo shall have access to federal
courts via a writ of habeas corpus).
13. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (holding that military tribunals created by executive order violated
international law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice).

about the critical role of lawyers and the legal system
and should be a
"must read" for judges dealing with these issues.14
Fourth, the Court has had to consider what is sufficient to constitute an
infringement of a fundamental right. At what point is the burdening of a
right sufficient to constitute an infringement? For example, does requiring
the Boy Scouts to include gays infringe the organization's freedom of
association? 5 Does requiring that livestock producers contribute to a fund
for generic advertising violate the First Amendment? 6 The excellent
article by Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky and Tera Jckowski Peterson looks at
whether the stringent restrictions on lawyer advertising in Florida should
be deemed an infringement and violation of the First Amendment. 7
Fifth, the Court has had to consider what government interests are
sufficient to justify violations of rights or discrimination. For example, the
Court had to consider whether a principal was justified in punishing a
student for holding up a banner, "Bong Hits 4 Jesus," at a school event on
a public sidewalk. 8 More dramatically, the Court concluded that diversity
in higher education is a compelling government interest that justifies
colleges and universities considering race as a factor in admitting
students. 9
The scholarly literature has focused on all of these areas and the cases
within them. There, of course, continues to be intense discussion about
how courts should define the content of constitutional rights. One
relatively new aspect of this debate has been the dispute over whether
American courts interpreting the Constitution should ever look to foreign
law. This debate is largely the result of the Court mentioning foreign
practices in striking down the death penalty for crimes committed by the
mentally retarded2 ° or by juveniles.2' Although the debate about this has
been intense, it is important to note that no Supreme Court decision
interpreting the Constitution ever has been based primarily, or even
substantially, on foreign law. Adam Lamparello's insightful article
discusses this and urges caution in using foreign law.22 Mr. Lamparello

14. Ariel Meyerstein, The Law andLawyers as Enemy Combatants, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 299 (2007).
15. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
16. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
17. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Tera Jckowski Peterson, Medium Specific Regulation of
Attorney Advertising: A Critique, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 259 (2007).
18. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (ruling in favor of the school principal).
19. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
20. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
21. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
22. Adam Lamparello, A New Method of Constitutional Interpretation: Introducing
"Negative Originalism," 18 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 383 (2007).

suggests that the gap between originalists and non-originalists might be
bridged by what he terms "negative originalism." Courts should look to the
original understanding to be sure that it does not reject a specific right, but
otherwise can be non-originalist.
There has been much less scholarly literature, though, on what is
sufficient to constitute an infringement of rights and how to determine
whether a government interest is sufficient to warrant an infringement.
These are crucial questions in constitutional law. For example, how should
a court determine whether there is a legitimate interest (under rational basis
review), an important interest (under intermediate scrutiny), or a
compelling interest (under strict scrutiny)? Advocates of originalism are
quick to argue that judges, including Supreme Court Justices, should not
be making value choices as to the content of constitutional rights. But how
can this possibly be avoided in deciding what is a sufficient interest to
justify discrimination or infringement of a constitutional right?
Of course, not all rights, or even most, are based on the Constitution.
This anniversary issue also contains important articles on statutory rights.
Bill F. Chamberlin, Cristina Popescu, Michael F.Weigold, and Nissa
Laughner have written a significant piece on how to assess the
effectiveness of public records laws.2 3 Additionally, Lawrence Scheinert
has written a fascinating note on a corporation's violations of the rights of
its directors: Hewlett-Packard's astounding use of investigators to go
through its directors' trash and private phone records.24
I congratulate this journal on celebrating its twentieth anniversary. In
writing this essay, I kept wondering what the law will be twenty years from
now when I hope the editors will invite me to write a foreword for the
fortieth anniversary issue. I realized that twenty years ago, no one could
have imagined the Internet and the countless legal issues it raises, or the
United States holding prisoners in Guantinamo or claiming the right to
detain individuals indefinitely as enemy combatants. But some issues are
as salient today as they were two decades ago: what can be done to
desegregate public schools, how may the government regulate abortion,
when can schools punish student speech?
Perhaps that is the greatest brilliance of the United States Constitution.
It provides a framework for discussing and deciding our most important
social issues, both enduring and new ones. Law journals play a key role in
this by providing a forum for discussion of ideas that can influence
23. Bill F. Chamberlin, CristinaPopescu, Michael F. Weigold, &Nissa Laughner, Searching
for Patterns in the Laws Governing Access to Records and Meetings in the Fifty States by Using
Multiple Research Tools, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUM. POL'Y 415 (2007).
24. Lawrence Scheinert, Note, Hewlett-Packard'sSpy Games and the "Duty ofCaremark
How Inconsistent Standards Governing a Director'sDuty of CareDisgraceda Company, 18 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 447 (2007).

thought, including by lawyers, judges, professors, and students. This
journal has done just that for two decades. I look forward to reading it for
decades to come.
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